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INTRODUCTION 
The search for more effective and reliable measures of 
depression continues, as evidenced by the development of new tests 
and evaluative procedures to deal with this problem. With the 
increasing emphasis on depressive phenomenon (Secunda, 1973), this 
issue will receive considerable attention. There are many problems 
encountered by those attempting to define and measure depression 
that have resulted in vague or equivocal research findings. Some 
of these problems involve the definition and understanding of the 
term "depression" itself, and others involve particular problems of 
measurement. The focus of the present study will be on the latter, 
specifically with the problem of test faking. 
The term 11 depression11 has caused much confusion and has 
contributed to many unclear research questions, and hence equivocal 
results. Depression is meant, at different times, to refer to: 
1) a particular feeling or emotion, 2) a symptom or symptom·complex, 
and 3) a well defined clinical or psychiatric entity. F'ailure to 
operationally define the intended meaning of depression can result 
in theoretical confusion and in the choice of inappropriate research 
instruments. Fortunately, most of the standard depression scales 
have clearly defined what they measure as 11 depression", usually 
referring to a psychiatric entity wi.th certain symptoms or symptom 
patterns (Zung, 1974a). 
Once this initial definition is made, however, there are 
1 
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still many issues to be considered. There are different systems 
for the classification of depression which are based on various 
dimensions within the depressive disorder. Definitions based on 
etiology have resulted in the distinction between endogenous and 
·#.' 
,. ,;..~ 
reactive depressions. Definitions based on the severity of the 
impairment to reality testing functions have resulted in the dis-
tinction between psychotic and neurotic depressions. The bipolar 
versus unipolar distinction is made on the basis of past history, 
and often on the response to differential medication. 
These distinctions within the clinical entity of depression 
complicate matters for researchers utilizing depression scales. -How 
can depression best be defined for a particular study, and which 
measurement best taps that particular dimension? Often, subjects 
labelled "depressed" by any of several criteria are presumably com-
bined to form "depressed" subject groups, although such techniques 
tend to dilute the practical significance of research findings. 
One alternative offered by Zung (1965, 1973) is to simply 
inventory the presence and severity of major depressive symptoms, 
and thereby provide a quantitative measurement of the strength of 
the disorder •. Such a technique avoids making the theoretical dis-
tinctions reviewed above, and allows a particular depression scale 
to be useful in many different applications, even though they may 
be based on different theoretical foundations. This is the basic 
assumption behL~d the development of the Zung Self-rating Depression 
Scale (1965). 
The Self-rating Depression Scale (SDS) is a short, self-
3 
report measurement of the presence and/or strength of depressive 
symptoms. Research suggests that the SDS may be an effective and 
reliable tool in the measurement of depression, useful in both 
clinical and research settings. However, there are still questions 
~-; 
to be considered. One of the serious problems facing self-report 
measures (such as the SDS) is that of test faking--the issue to 
which this investigation is directed. The present study concerns 
the fakability of the Zung SDS. Faking is a threat to the validity 
of test information, defined as the deliberate biasing of test re-
sponses in order to manipulate the impression given by the test 
results. It has been studied in connection with many personality 
and diagnostic instruments, and is often investigated in the process 
of establishing the validity of such personality measurements. 
As a self-report scale, the SDS might be open to direct 
subject manipulation. Such manipulation would result in invalid 
diagnostic information and could conceivably lead to inappropriate 
treatment decisions in clinical settings. In research applications, 
SDS faking could result in unexplainable experimental findings. Test 
manipulation might take two forms. Non-depressed persons could fake 
in the more depressed direction (referred to as "faking-bad" in the 
literature) for purposes of malingering, maintaining dependency on 
hospital status, or perhaps as support for seeking advantages from 
the "sick role", such as attempting to qualify for undeserved dis-
ability benefits. 
On the other hand, depressed persons might fake test scores 
in the less depressed direction (referred to as 11 faking-good") to 
4 
distort the information obtained on screening batteries, in order 
to avoid appropriate treatment for depression, or to secure early 
and premature discharge from hospitalization. 
The research investigating test faking on the SDS (Mikesell 
& Calhoun, 1969; Swanson & Anderson, 1972) has not provided a satis-
factory examination of the question. It has been reported that 
subjects were successful in mainpulating SDS scores toward the more 
depressed direction but not toward the less depressed direction, 
and no explanation has been offered for this finding that runs 
counter to the literature on the faking of other personality inven-
tories. In many other cases, subjects can fake test results in both 
directions at will (Cronbach, 1972). It is hypothesized that these 
results were due to design characteristics of the studies involved 
which rendered the 3fforts of fake-good subjects nonsignificant. 
To test the suggestion that subjects can fake the SDS in both the 
more and less·depressed directions, revised experimental instructions 
will be employed ~ attenuate these design characteristics. It is 
hypothesized in this study that subjects will score significantly 
higher SDS scores than controls when asked to fake in the more 
depressed direction, and significantly lower SDS scores than controls 
when asked to fake in the less depressed direction. 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
BACK GROUND OF THE SDS 
The Self-rating Depression Scale (SDS) was developed by 
Zung (1965) in order to meet the clinical and research needs for 
a quick, reliable and relatively theory-free measurement of depres-
sion. It is a symptom based inventory that quantitatively measures 
the strength of major depressive symptoms. In the process of doing 
so, it defines depression as a psychiatric disorder that is char-
acterized by certain specific symptom patterns. After making this 
initial assumption, the SDS remains relatively atheoretical in that 
it does not distinguish between the previously mentioned conceptual 
entities within the depressive disorder {eg., endogenous versus 
reactive; psychotic versus neurotic; etc.). It simply identifies 
the presence and strength of major depressive symptoms. It is 
designed to monitor only those symptoms specifically linked to the 
diagnosis of depression, and to avoid the confusion that cru1 ensue 
when other commonly-seen symptoms are not factored out--such as 
signs of anxiety, usually seen in depressed patients, but also seen 
in most all psychiatric and emotional disorders. In fact, Zung has 
developed a Self-rating Anxiety Scale (SAS) to monitor the presence 
of anxiety as a distinct, though often parallel phenomenon (Zung, 
1974a). 
In deciding which symptoms to include in the SDS (and which 
5 
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to include in his definition of depression), Zung relied on the work 
of previous investigators who had reviewed and summarized research 
findings on depression. Grinker, et al (1961) used factor analysis 
in their investigation of depressive symptoms, attempting to iden-
tify the underlying factors or patterns of the disorder. They fac-
tored out five such feeling patterns often mentioned by depressives, 
and 10 behavioral factors derived from a behavioral checklist. Grin-
ker's five feeling patterns were: dismal, hopeless feelings; concern 
over material loss; guilt over wong doing; anxiety; and demanding, 
angry feelings. The 10 behavioral factors were: isolation, with-
eli-awl, retardation of speech and thought, disinterest and apathy, 
demanding and angry, hypochondriachal complaints, cognitive distur-
bances, agitation, rigidity and immobility, clinging and pleading, 
and somatic disturbances. 
In a similar cataloguing of depressive symptomatology, Over-
all (1962) employed 31 depressive measures and singled out seven 
major factors which underlied most of the 5,1mptoms he observed. 
These seven factors were: depression in mood, guilt, anxiety and 
apprehension, psychomotor retardation, subjective experiences of 
impairment, abnormal preoccupation with physical health, and physical 
responses to stress (such as loss of appetite, sleep and weight). 
In a third review cited by Zung in developing the SDS, 
r 
Friedman, et al (1963) studied the symptom complaints, test scores, 
and trait ratings of 170 hospitalized psychotic depressives. They 
employed rather stringent criteria for subject selection in order 
to restrict their study to symptoms characteristic of depression only. 
7 
They determined 22 symptoms and trait variables seen most often in 
their depressed sample and factor analyzed them. The analysis 
described four main factors which they referred to as "types" of 
depression. The four "types" were: 1) a classical mood or affective 
disturbance with guilt, loss of self-esteem, and tendencies to 
internalize feelings; 2) a retarded and withdrawn type; 3) a pri-
marily biological reaction with loss of appetite, sleep, etc.; and 
4) a querulous, hypochondriacal type characterized as demanding, 
self-preoccupied and complaining. It is unclear whether these four 
factors in depressive symptoms were independent enough to be seen 
asdifferent 11 types11 of depression, or whether they were simply 
different aspects of depressive manifestations attributed to all 
depressives. 
It is important to note about these reviews that they all 
are factor analytic studies, and as such have an inherent problem. 
The factors derived in this type of analysis depend to a high degree 
on the symptoms and traits included by the investigators. Therefore, 
the resultant factors may simply reflect the clinical observations 
and hypotheses of the experimenters. Because of this aspect of 
factor analysis, these studies should be interpreted as a quantita-
tive reflection of the prevalent psychiatric diagnostic and observa-
tional process. The fact that each of these studies arrives at 
' 
similar factors or patterns in depressive symptoms suggests a uni-
formity in the observational techniques of the different investi-
gators, and may also suggest a general psychiatric consensus about 
these manifestations of depressive disorders. 
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Zung used these factor analytic studies (Friedman, et al., 
1963; Grinker, et al., 1961; Overall, 1962) as a basis for choosing 
which symptoms to monitor with the SDS. He combined many of the 
conclusions of the previous reviews as his criteria for diagnosing 
a depressive disorder (Zung, 1965). His criteria (detailed in 
Appendix A) are divided into the following four categories: 1) a 
pervasive affective disturbance (depressed mood), 2) physiological 
symptoms (variations in sleep, appetite, or other biological symp-
toms), 3) psychomoto~ disturbances (either retardation or agitation), 
and 4) psychological disturbances (such as hopelessness, confusion, 
irritability, and suicidal ruminations). These characteristics 
became Zung's (1973) operational definition of a depressive disorder: 
a psychiatric disorder characterized by these four types of distur-
bances. In evaluating the literature on the symptomatology of 
depression, Zung's criteria seem to adequately cover the range of 
symptoms usually presented by patients later diagnosed as depressed. 
In addition, symptoms strongly related to somatic anxiety are kept 
to a minimum, presumably to keep depression and anxiety as separately 
measured disorders. 
The SDS comprises 20 items, each representing one of the 
"characteristic" symptoms of depression. The items were derived 
from verbatim records of patient interview material. The test items 
are listed in Appendix B. In taking the SDS, a patient is asked to 
rate each of the items as to how it applies to him at the time of 
testing with these quantitative terms: none or a little of the time, 
some of the time, a good part of the time, or most or all of the time. 
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Zung (1973) claims that the use of an even number of response cate-
gories is an attempt to prevent subjects from checking the middle 
answers in hopes of appearing 11 average 11 • However, this claim seems 
spurious because a test protocol composed of center-marked responses 
(if possible) would yield a score in the diagnosed depressed range. 
RESEARCH WITH THE SDS 
Zung (1965) reported validation data for the SDS from a 
population .of 56 psychiatric patients admitted to a VA hospital 
with a primary diagnosis of depressive disorder. Of these 56, 31 
were eventually treated and discharged as having depressive dis-
orders, and obtained an averag~ SDS index of 74 before treatment, 
and 39 after treatment (usually the day before discharge). The 
other 25 original patients were further evaluated and rediagnosed 
and treated as having other psychiatric disorders. This other-
diagnosed group obtained a mean SDS index of 53. As a normal control 
group, Zung tested 100 individuals, composed more or less equally 
of professional staff, nonporfessional staff_and patients hospital-
ized for other reasons in various medical wards, who were 11 free from 
observable symptoms of depression(p. 66) 11 • This normal group 
obtained a mean SDS index of 33, with scores ranging from 25 to 43. 
An important criticism of this study, and 9ne which relates 
to other validation research concerns the definition of "depressed" 
patients. Zung (1965) described the criteria for inclusion into the 
subject population as diagnosis of a "depressive disorder". It is 
unclear what was diagnosed as a depressive disorder and which tra-
10 
ditional diagnostic groups were included in the subject population. 
Such a problem must be seen as a major weakness in the validation 
research in the SDS. 
Further research with the SDS (Zung, Richards & Short, 1965) 
reported experience with the SDS in an outpatient setting. A sample 
of 152 outpatients was given the SDS and MMPI; results showed that 
patients diagnosed as having psychoneurotic depressive reactions 
obtained a mean SDS index of 64, while several other diagnostic 
groups all obtained mean indices from 53 to 55. These figures 
compare quite closely with those previously reported (Zung, 1965). 
In addition, the SDS correlated highest with the MMPI D scale (r= 
0.70) and Pt scale (r=0.68), and expect~dly lowest with the Ma scale 
(r=0.13). 
Zung (1969) reported data from a cross-cultural study using 
collaborators from Australia, Czechoslovakia, England, Germany, 
Japan and Switzerland. The sample included 1,043 patients and 364 
controls ("normals") who took the SDS. He reported that patients 
rated by a psychiatrist as having "mild to moderate depressions" 
had SDS indices between 50 and 59, patients with "moderate to severe 
depressions" scores between €JJ and 69, and patients rated as having 
"severe depressions" obtained indices of 70 and above. The mean 
control group ("normal") score was 37 in this cross-cultural study, 
. I 
somewhat higher than the initial report of 33 (Zung~ 1965). 
In two later reports about the incidence of depression in 
the normal population, Zung (1971, 1972b) noted another revision 
of the "normal" SDS mean score. In combining much of the data he 
11 
had previously collected, he reported that the normal SDS index 
was 39 (standard deviation = 10), which he believes is more repre-
sentative of the normal population than the original estimate. 
Based on this data, Zung concluded that depression as a clinical 
entity is not a feature of the normal population between the ages 
of 20 and 64. When looking at subjects under 19 and over 65, he 
also maintains that depression as a clinical entity is not normal; 
however, the data suggests that the baseline is higher in these 
extreme age groups, and any cutoff score for diagnosing depression 
is liable to incorrectly label more younger and older subjects as 
depressed. A morbidity cutoff score of 50 on the SDS correctly 
identified 88% of all depressed patients in his sample, and missed 
12% of the depressed subjects. This sample was not controlled for 
age, and included subjects of all age groups. This, of course, is 
a statistical.statement of the "normality" of depression; that 
depression as diagnosed by the SDS represents less than 50% of the 
population at large. It does not refer to any other possible mani-
festations of depression, such as the experiences of depression in 
normal adults (Blatt, D'Afflitti & Quinlan, 1976). 
It mnst be noted that in this validation research, SDS scores 
were measured against a variety of diagnostic criteria. In the 
original inpatient (Zung, 1965) and outpatient (Zung, Richards & 
Short, 1965) samples, admitting and discharge diagnoses were used as 
validating criteria. In the cross-cultural study (Zung, 1969), psy-
chiatrists' global ratings of depression were used. In a study of 
the incidence of depression in the normal population (Zung, 1971), 
12 
11 normalit~' was defined as the capacity to work, and normal subjects 
were selected by testing all staff personnel who showed up for work 
on predetermined days. Because of the wide disparity in evaluative 
criteria, evaluators' training, and use of diagnostic terminology, 
such results can only be seen as rough guidelines for the use of 
SDS scores in actual clinical settings. Furthermore, because the 
SDS is a symptomatic inventory, it does not distinguish between 
theoretical entities within the depressive phenomenon (eg., psy-
chotic versus neurotic, and endogenous versus reactive depressions). 
In the cases where psychiatric diagnoses were used as validating 
criteria, investigators have presumably combined all types of 
depressive diagnoses into one research category: depressive disorder. 
This ·makes practical sense ~n that the SDS is designed to measure 
simply the strength of all major depressive symptoms, which are 
likely to be presented by both psychotic and neurotic depressives; 
but such a practice also ignores the theoretical assumptions of the 
original diagnosticians. In any case, this initial validation 
research, using as it does many types of criteria, does suggest 
that the SDS measures what is widely labelled as depression. The 
diversity of validating criteria may even strengthen this suggestion. 
It is also worthy of note that patients with primary diag-
noses other than depression are apt to score in the elevated ranges 
on the SDS. Zung's (1965) group of inpatients eventually diagnosed 
and treated as having other psychiatric disorders obtained a mean 
SDS index of 53 (range 38-71) which falls into the mild to moderately 
depressed range, as delineated in the manual. This, however, is to 
13 
be expected because many of the symptoms of depression are present 
in a variety of other disorders, and because depression itself is 
a feature of many psychiatric problems. In such cases, the SDS 
functions by measuring the depressive symptoms or trends in patients 
with other primary diagnoses. 
Zung (1965) reports no reliability data with the original 
scale, an ommision which was labelled as 11 inexcusable" by Goldstein 
in his review of the SDS (1972). However, in a later publication 
concerning the Depression Status Inventory, Zung (1972a) provides 
some data about the reliability of the SDS. He reported that the 
split-half reliability correlation for the SDS was 0.73 (p < .01). 
Although a more extensive statement is clearly needed about the 
scale's reliability, this is the only data published to date. 
Other research with the SDS has explored its relation to 
various personality and demographic variables. Zung (1967a) reported 
that the SDS does not correlate significantly with age, sex, marital 
status, educational level, financial status, or intelligence. How-
ever, several qualifications must be added to these claims. All 
subjects were required to pass the Ohio Literacy Test before taking 
the SDS, and hence the lower extremes of the educational and intel-
ligence level variables were not examined. And in terms of the SDS's 
relation to patient age, the sample ranged in age from 20 to 64, 
. 
and therefore any effects in younger and older subjects were not 
observable. As was reviewed before, there is evidence to suggest 
higher baseline scores in subjects over the age of 65. Zung (1967b) 
reported that in a sample of 169 11 normal11 older subjects (aged 65-95), 
14 
the mean SDS index was 48 (standard deviation = 10.5) with a range 
of 25 to 80. What accounted for these elevated scores in older 
subjects was primarily their ratings of biological items reflecting 
the ageing process, such as reduced appetite, sleep, libido and 
activity levels. In light of this, such elevations would be ex-
pected in older subjects, and in any subjects experiencing major 
physiological changes, such as disabled individuals. 
The relationship between the SDS and other commonly-used 
depression measurements has also been explored (Brown & Zung, 1972; 
Zung, 1967a, 1969; Zung, Richards & Short, 1965). Correlations be-
.tween the SDS and various scales of the }MPI have been reported; 
correlations with the D scale ranging from 0.59 to 0.70, correlation 
with the ~~ scale (presumably measuring different, often opposite 
symptoms) expectedly low at 0.13, and correlation with the Pt scale 
of 0.68. The high correlation between the SDS and the Pt scale 
(Zung, Richards & Short, 1965) is explained by the suggestion that 
the MMPI 1 s D and Pt scales tap many of the same symptoms. In this 
particular study, they correlated 0.79 with each other. 
In addition, the above literature details correlations be-
tween the SDS and other depression scales. Zung (1969) reports 
correlations between the SDS and the Hamilton Rating Scale for De-
pression of 0.56, between the SDS and the Beck In~entory of Depres-
sion of 0.72 and 0.76, between the SDS and Lubin's Depression Ad-
jectives Check List of 0.29, and between the SDS and the Eysenck 
Personality Inventory of -0.08. 
Zung (1969, 1973) interprets this data as suggesting tr~t 
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the SDS correlates highly with specific depression rating scales 
(eg., MMPI-D, Hamilton, or Beck) but correlates to a low degree with 
nonspecific scales (eg., DACL or EPI). This is because "specific" 
scales are objective and quantitative measurements of certain symp-
toms, and yield a numerical score describing the severity of depres-
sion affecting an individual. They ask the same types of questions, 
use the same type of data, and offer the same type of determination--
a numerical description of the strength of the symptom picture. 
"Nonspecific" scales, on the other hand, are often more global in 
nature and attempt to measure depression in more indirect ways. 
What these results suggest is that specific depression rating scales 
may measure different aspects of depression than nonspecific tech-
niques. The SDS is a specific, symptom-based measurement, and hence 
correlates highly with others of its kind: the MMPI-D, Hamilton, 
and Beck. 
In clinical research, the SDS was used to predict the type 
of treatment given to depressed Fatients, differentiating between 
those receiving ECT and those given anti-depressant medication alone 
(Zung & Wonnacott, 1970). Results indicated that the SDS could 
distinguish between the two groups of patients, and that the factors 
related to the type of treatment administered were: those receiving 
ECT emphasized the biological items on the SDS, while those treated 
' 
only with medication endorsed more of the psychological symptoms of 
the SDS. In another "applied" study, the SDS was used successfully 
as a screening device to identify those 5th and 6th graders who 
were rated by their teachers as having potential adjustment problems 
16 
(Ivanoff, Layman & Von Singer, 1973) • 
Summary 
The SDS is a short, 20 item self-rating depression scale~ 
It defines a depressive disorder as a psychiatric entity characterized 
by: 1) a mood disturbance (sadness, depression), 2) physiological 
symptoms (loss of appetite, sleep, libido, etc.), 3) psychomotor 
agitation or retardation, and 4) psychological disturbances (such 
as confusion, irritability, suicidal ruminations, etc.). The SDS 
is designed to measure the presence and/or strength of major depres-
sive symptoms and yield a quantitative description of the severity 
of the depressive disorder. 
Research with the SDS suggests that it reliably distinguishes 
those patients labelled depressed (by a variety of criteria) both 
from nondepressed normals, and from patients having other psychiatric 
disorders. Depressive disorders, as measured by the SDS are not a 
feature of the normal population, although baseline SDS scores may 
be elevated in subjects under the age of 20 and over the age of 65. 
The SDS correlated highly with other depression measurements in use 
(the Beck, Hamilton, and MMPI-D scales), and one can reasonably 
assume that it is measuring the same phenomenon. Its added benefit 
is its simplicity and brevity, often a significant advantage when 
testing severly disturbed individuals. 
Because the SDS is a self-administered test without the 
benefit of a validity scale (like the MMPI 1 s), it is important to 
explore the possibility that patients may fake test results to look 
more or less depressed than is indicated. This can become of 
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practical importance when it is noted that the SDS might be used to 
determine the type of treatment administered to incoming patients, 
or to monitor the course of ongoing treatment. In such cases, de-
liberately manipulated test scores may result in inappropriate treat-
ment decisions. In research a~plications, deliberately biased test 
results may lead to invalid data correlations or interpretations. 
There is a large body of research on the faking of test 
results that suggests such manipulation is often accomplished quite 
easily. Some of this literature is reviewed below. 
LITERATURE ON TEST FAKING 
Faking is a threat to the validity of test results, and is 
defined as deliberat~ manipulation of test data in order to distort 
or bias the resultant information. Such manipulation often takes 
two forms: oiasing test results to look more abnormal than is actually 
the case (referred to as faking 11 bad11 in the literature), or biasing 
test data to appear less abnormal or more socially desirable (refer-
red to as faking "good") • Faking in either direction may have ad-
vantages in certain situations. Non-depressed persons might fake 
11 bad11 on depression inventories to prolong hospitalization, or to 
maintain various benefits of the sick role. Depressed persons might 
fake 11 good" on a depression inventory in order to avoid treatment, 
secure premature discharge from treatment, or perhaps to distort 
the information revealed on initial screening batteries. 
The research on test manipulation indicates that subjects 
have often biased their test scores in order to influence the im-
18 
pressions given on many different tests and inventories. In research 
dealing with common diagnostic and personality measurements, the 
paradigm usually involves giving instructions to answer the test 
items as if describing a certain kind of person, or in order to 
emphasize a certain quality to the examiner. Some examples will 
illustrate the point. Gendreau, Irvine and Kinght (1973) reported 
that their subjects (Canadian prison inmates) were able to signifi-
cantly alter test scores in the MMPI in order to appear both~ 
and less abnormal than control subjects. Several studies have demon-
strated the fakability of the Gordon Personality Inventory toward 
both normal and abnormal-looking profiles (Braun & Farrell, 1974; 
Schwab, 1971, 1974). In these studies, experimental fake-bad groups 
were asked to respond as an emotionally disturbed individual might. 
Fake-good groups were asked to respond as a happy, well-adjusted 
individual might. In all cases, the experimental groups were able 
to significantly alter their scores in the appropriate directions. 
Forced-choice inventories, such as the Edwards Personality 
Preference Scales (EPPS), are thought to be more resistant to faking 
efforts (Cronbach, 1972). This is because the process of faking 
involves perception of the more socially desirable responses, and 
then choice of these responses over the less socially desirable ones. 
In forced-choice situations, responses are matched for degree of 
I 
social desirability, hence one cannot readily choose simply the more 
desirable responses to influence the test results. Faking on forced-
choice instruments involves manipulation toward particular attributes 
that are not matched in the preparation of response pairs. For 
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example, a subject might succeed in attempting to bias answers to 
the EPPS to appear more flexible or aggressive, because these at-
tributes are not matched on the EPPS--responses are matched only for 
social desirability. However, even with these constraints, subjects 
have demonstrated successful manipulation on a number of EPPS scales 
(Braun & Tinley, 1972; Kirchner, 1962) • 
The literature is replete with examples of successful mani-
pulation on many commonly-used instruments. Subjects have demon-
strated the faking of scores on the State-Trait Anxiety Scale by 
exaggerating their signs of stress (Smith, 1974). Braun and Smith 
(1973) reported significant faking on the Self-Perception Inventory 
by asking subjects to create "most favorable" and "least favorable" 
impressions of themselves. Gayton, Ozman and Wilson (1973) reported 
that subjects could fake the Psychological Screening Inventory, and 
interestingly, faked "bad" more convinvingly than they could fake 
in the "good" dirrection. Braun, Iervolino and Francis (1973) ex-
plored faking on the Comrey Personality Scales and reported that 
subjects could fake 11 good'' when asked to make an "excellent impres-
sion" of themselves. However, they noted that the faking-detection 
scales of the Comrey were useful in monitoring test protocols, even 
when subjects were told of them and asked to fake in such a way as. 
to evade detection. The faking-detection scale identified 54-64% 
of those subjects who were deliberately manipulating their scores. 
In addition, Cronbach (1972) describes successful faking 
on several other personality and interest questionnaires. He even 
reports that subjects have demonstrated the ability to fake person-
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ality tests in order to appear as idealized salesmen when applying 
for sales jobs. Such manipulation involves complex skills and the 
ability to formulate particular personality patterns in terms of 
test responses. 
Summary 
This body of research on the faking of test results indicates 
that subjects can often manipulate the impressions they give on many 
standard personality inventories. They can appear more or less ab-
normal, either rigid or flexible, and can even mimic the response 
patterns of certain stereotyped persons (eg., salesmen). Some in-
struments, however, are more difficult to fake than others. It is 
difficult to control test faking, and many test designers have re-
sponded by developing validity or faking-detection scales within 
the body of the particular test (such as the MMPI's F, L, and K 
scales). Many other tests, however, have no faking-detection measure-
ments; the SDS is one such test. When using instruments without 
validity scales, it becomes more important to understand the limits 
of fakability of the particular inventory. This involves knowing 
if a certain measurement can be faked, in which directions (or toward 
which characteristics), and to what extent. The investigations of 
faking on the SDS have yielded inconclusive results. 
FAKING ON THE SDS 
Mikesell and Calhoun (1969) explored faking on the SDS with 
150 high school students asked to complete the depression scale 
under common faking instructions. The control group was asked to 
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"answer the items truthfully". Fake-good subjects (those asked to 
fake test results in the less depressed direction) were asked to 
"answer the items so as to give people the most favorable impression 
of you; try to answer as if you are a completely happy and well-
adjusted person without any problems". The fake-bad subjects (in-
structed to fake in the ~ depressed direction) were asked to 
"answer the items so as to give people the worst possible impression; 
try to answer as if you are a completely unhappy and severly mal-
adjusted person with a lot of problems". They reported that their 
subjects could significantly alter their SDS scores in the more 
depressed (fake-bad) direction, but could not fake significantly in 
the less depressed (fake-good) direction. They offered no explanation 
for these interesting findings, only cautioning that it was quite 
easy for subjects to appear unfavorable on the SDS. 
In the process of the experiment, they also opened up a new 
area of question for users of the SDS--applicability of the norms 
with younger subjects. Their control group (presumably reflecting 
11 normal11 high school scores) obtained a mean SDS index of 48; there 
were no differences between male and female subjects. This "normal" 
mean is considerably higher than Zung's (1965) original report of 33, 
and nears ranges defined as abnormal in the SDS manual (Zung, 1974b). 
Zung's research (1969, 1973) suggests that an SDS score of 50 is the 
lower limit of the range described as "mild to moderate" depression. 
Zung, Richards and Short (1965) reported that a cutoff of 50 accu-
rately identified 88% of their depressed patients and incorrectly 
labelled 12% of the normals. In the face of this, Mikesell and 
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Calhoun's (1969) normal mean of 48 for high school subjects is 
surprisingly high. 
Although Zung (1969) originally claimed that SDS scores did 
not correlate significantly with age, he has modified his position 
in later publications (1973, 1974a) and suggests that there will 
be more 11 incorrect hi ts11 when standard SDS cutoffs are used with 
younger individuals. This appears to be due to a higher baseline 
SDS level in younger subjects. Mikesell and Calhoun called for an 
investigation of norms for high school subjects to validate their 
findings. And since the SDS has been used in research with subjects 
a:s young as 10 years old, extended norms are clearly needed. 
Swanson and Anderson (1972) refined the Mikesell and Calhoun 
design in hopes of explaining why previous subjects had successfully 
manipulated the SDS only in the more depressed direction. They 
hypothesized that instructing the test subjects as to the nature of 
the SDS might facilitate their efforts to manipulate test scores 
toward less depressed results. They used junior college students 
as subjects (mean age= 22.1 years), and added two additional groups 
to the design; an extra fake-good and fake-bad group which were told 
that the SDS measured depression when interpreted by a psychologist. 
The information on the nature of the SDS did not help, however, and 
they reported results similar to Mikesell and Calhoun. Subjects 
altered their scores significantly in the ~depressed direction, 
but not in the less depressed direction. Using a different popula-
tion, they could not examine the question of inflated norms for high 
school students raised by Hikesell and Calhoun. Their college con-
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trol group obtained a mean SDS index of 35, similar to Zung's ori-
ginal estimate of 33. They also used the same faking instructions 
as before, so that any possible inhibitory effect of the particular 
instructions remains unexplored. 
Why have researchers been able to demonstrate faking on the 
SDS only toward more depressed scores? One possible explanation is 
that people may have a clearer idea of what is abnormal than of what 
is normal, and hence, it is easier for them to fake bad than to fake 
good. This explanation seems unlikely in vie1,1 of the large body of 
research on the faking of other tests. In most all such research, 
faking was demonstrated in the "positive" or normal direction as 
well as in the "negative" or abnormal direction. On these tests and 
inventories, subjects have demonstrated the ability to ferret out 
socially desirable responses; it seems unlikely that the SDS is 
radically different in this respect. In fact, oany of its items 
are identical to those on, for instance, the MMPI, which has been 
successfully faked in the more normal direction (Gendreau, Irvine 
& Knight, 1973). 
A similar argument suggests that using normal subjects to 
fake "more normal" will predictably lead to insignificant results. 
However, this appraisal of the experimental procedures is inaccurate. 
Normal subjects are asked to appear less depressed than is normal 
(by describing an unrealistically happy pers?n)--which takes into 
account the baserate of depressive symptomatology in the normal 
population. As argued above, the successful paradigm followed in 
other faking research has been to use normal subjects to manipulate 
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tests in both abnormal and idealized-normal directions. Such an 
explanation fails to detail why this paradigm has proved successful 
with the faking of other tests, but not with the SDS. 
Another possible explanation for the demonstration o~ faking 
only in the more depressed direction is statistical in nature. With 
a control group mean SDS index of 35 (Swanson & Anderson, 1972), 
there is less "room" for manipulation of scores toward the lower, 
less depressed end of the scale (25) than toward the more depressed 
end (100). Thus, a bottoming-out effect might reduce the significance 
of faking good efforts on the SDS. Inconsistent with this explana-
tion, however, is the fact that subjects in the Mikesell and Calhoun 
(1969) study failed to fake significantly lower than their control 
group, which had the unusually high mean of LJ3. In this instance, 
there would have been no bottoming-out phenomenon operating to in-
hibit faking good, and yet the fake-good group still failed to score 
significantly lower than controls. In sum, this statistical con-
straint may have effected the Swanson and Anderson (1972) study, but 
not the Mikesell and Calhoun (1969) data. The evidence does not yet 
fully support this statistical interpretation. 
Another possible explanation involves the experimental tech-
nique used in the two previous studies. With both using the same 
instructions and producing similarly unexplained results, it seems 
' possible that the instructional set somehow inhibited the fake-good 
subjects and/or facilitated the fake-bad subjects. It is hypothe-
sized that an interaction between the instructions used and the statis-
tical constraints explained above prevented the demonstration of 
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faking in the less depressed direction on the SDS. Subjects instruct-
ed to fake less depressed (to answer as if they were completely happy 
and well-adjusted) might have felt constrained to not seem "too ob-
vious" or "too extreme" in their responses. Such a constraint would 
keep their scores tending toward the middle rather than the extremes 
of the scoring range (marking 2's and 3's rather than 1's or 4's). 
Because the control group mean is closer to the less depressed end 
of the scale, one must respond to items in the extremes in order to 
appear significantly less depressed than the already not too depressed 
control subjects. If such a set toward moderation in responding was 
in fact operating, the efforts of fake-good subjects would remain 
nonsignificant. 
Psychiatric patients, on the other hand, would not be oper-
ating under the same perceived constraints, and their average scores 
would fall more toward the depressed end of the scale. The statis-
tical situation would be reversed and it would be easier for them to 
fake in the less depressed direction. In effect, they might fake 
less depressed when our data from normal subjects indicates that the 
SDS cannot be so manipulated. 
To explore this possibility, it would be desirable to have 
an actual patient population attempt to fake the SDS, but such a use 
of patients might be questionable both in terms of ethical consider-
ations and with regard to patient cooperation. Depressed patients, 
exhibiting lowered motivation and energy levels, might not be very 
cooperative or invested in such a task where perceived benefit was 
admittedly small. 
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Using a student population, instead, to explore this issue, 
as has already been done, requires some procedural modifications. 
The experimental groups need to be given instructions that remove 
some of the "restraints of moderation". In such a way, we might 
observe the potential of faking in the less depressed direction on 
the SDS, rather than the attenuated performance of subjects inhibiting 
their manipulatory abilities. 
SUMMARY AND HYPOTHESES 
Research suggests that the Zung Self-rating Depression Scale 
is a reliable and effective tool for the measurement of depressive 
symptomatology. It is quick to administer and has demonstrated the 
ability to differentiate to an acceptable degree between individuals 
with depressive disorders and those with other diagnoses. It also 
correlates favorably with other standard depression inventories. 
However, because it is a self-report measure without the 
benefit of validity or faking-detection scales, it is important to 
assess the fakability of the SDS, so as to measure the validity of 
its information. The literature on the faking of personality and 
interest tests indicates that subjects can often ascertain socially 
desirable responses, and bias the impressions they give on test 
protocols. Research exploring the fakability of the SDS has suggested 
that subjects can fake SDS scores in the more depressed direction, 
but not in the less depressed direction. This finding runs counter 
to the literature on the faking of other personality measurements; 
on many other tests, subjects can fake-good with regularity. It is 
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hypothesized that the inability of previous subjects to demonstrate 
faking in the less depressed direction on the SDS is due to an 
inhibitory effect of the instructional sets and certain statistical 
constraints. If this explanation is accurate, the potential of 
faking on the SDS, especially in the less depressed direction has 
not been investigated. 
This thesis is an attempt to measure that potential of faking 
on the SDS. It is hypothesized that subjects can manipulate SDS 
scores in both the ~ and less depressed directions, and that they 
will demonstrate this ability when instructed to do so under circum-
stances designed to counter the statistical constraints operating in 
previous investigations. In the present study, experimental instruc-
tions were designed to facilitate the manipulation of test scores by 
removing perceived restraints against responding in the extreme ranges. 
Instead of having subjects describe themselves, they were asked to 
describe an idealized person who was either completely happy and well-
adjusted, or completely unhappy and troubled. This depersonalization 
of the instructions was presumed to facilitate responding in t~e ex-
treme ranges where subjects describing themselves might hesitate to 
answer. In addition, subjects were asked to respond in this way, even 
if the resultant answers seem too obvious or would be blatently untrue 
if applied to themselves. It was expected that if subjects can deter-
mine the socially desirable, less depressed responses on the SDS, then 
with this instructional set, they will demonstrate this manipulatory 
ability by scoring significantly lower (less depressed) and higher 
(more depressed) than the control group subjects. 
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In ad~ition to investigating the fakability of the SDS, the 
question of applicability of the norms for high school subjects was 
also examined. Subjects vJere drawn from both populations previously 
used to explore faking on the SDS: there were separate samples of 
college and high school students. The use of both these subject 
populations permitted an investigation of Mikesell and Calhoun's 
(1969) report of elevated "normal" SDS scores in high school students, 
and it increased the comparability of the present findings to previous 
ones. The subjects were not divided by sex, as the data from Mikesell 
and Calhoun's study (1969) indicated that there were no sex differ-
ences in either baseline SDS scores or in the faking of SDS scores. 
Thus, this experiment utilized two separate samples, each 
divided into three groups (control, fake-good, and fake-bad), totaling 
six subject groups in all. There were five separate hypotheses for 
this study. For the high school sample, it was hypothesized that high 
school students would score significantly lower SDS scores than the 
high school control group when asked to fake in the less depressed 
direction (H1), and significantly higher than their controls when 
asked to fake in the more depressed direction (H2) • For the college 
sample, it was hypothesized that college subjects would score signif-
icantly lower SDS scores than college control subjects when asked to 
fake in the less depressed direction (H3), and sign~icantly higher 
than their control when asked to fake in the more depressed direction 
(H4). In addition, following the lead of Mikesell and Calhoun (1969), 
it was hypothesized that the high school control group would score 
significantly higher than the college control group on the SDS, as 
r 
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evidence of the suggestion of higher baseline SDS norms in younger 
subjects (H5). 
METHOD 
SUBJECTS 
Seventy-five high s~hool students and 75 college undergradu-
ates participated as subjects in this experiment. The 75 high school 
students were tested at Gordon Technical High School. All were male; 
approximately 2/3 were freshmen, the remaining 1/3 being seniors. 
Their ages ranged from 14-19 with a mean of 15.47 (standard deviation 
=-1.59 years). 
The 75 college subjects were recruited from undergraduate 
psychology classes at Loyola University. Of these subjects, there 
were 16 males and 59 females. Their ages ranged from 18 to 34 with 
a mean of 21.90 (standard deviation= 4.19 years). Although subjects 
were drawn from psychology classes, only a minority of the subjects 
identified themselves to be psychology majors. 
MATERIALS 
The Zung Self-rating Depression Scale was administered, ac-
cording to a revised version by Zung (1974). The SDS is a 20-item 
inventory in which the subject is instructed to rate the presence 
and s~·ength of each of the 20 symptoms by checking one of the follow-
ing quantitative responses: none or a little of the time, some of 
the time, a good part of the time, most or all of the time. The 
scale items are counter-weighted with equal numbers of positively 
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and negatively worded statements. 
The SDS is constructed so that less depressed subjects obtain 
lower scores and more depressed subjects obtain higher ones. In 
scoring the SDS, the quantitative verbal responses are assigned values 
~ from 1 to 4, depending on whether the item was worded positively or 
negatively, and a total of the raw scores is computed. This total 
can range from 20 to 80. An index for the SDS is obtained by dividing 
the raw score total by 80 and converting to a whole number which can 
range from 25 to 100. What this index calculation produces is simply 
the percentage of the total possible score obtained by the subject. 
An SDS index of 50 represents 50% of the depressive pathology re-
ported on the scale. 
The scale was transferred to test forms, upon which were 
typed the experimental instructions for the separate groups,(see 
Appendix B for copies of the test forms for the control group, the 
fake-good group, and the fake-bad group, respectively). 
Control group subjects were instructed to: "Answer these 
items honestly as they apply to you. 11 Fake-good subjects were in-
structed to: 
Answer these items so as to create the best possible im-
pression. Try to answer as if you were describing a 
completely happy person without any emotional problems. 
Respond in this way even if the answers seem obvious to 
you, or would be untrue if applied to you. 
Fake-bad subjects were instructed to: 
Answer these items so as to create the worst possible 
impression. Try to answer as if you were describing a 
completely unhappy person with many emotional problems. 
Respond in this way even if the answers seem obvious to 
you, or would be untrue if applied to you. 
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PROCEDURE 
All of the subjects were tested in group administrations 
during class hours at their respective schools. They were randomly 
assigned to experimental groups by the following procedure. The 
control, fake-good, and fake-bad forms of the SDS were stacked 
alternately before being handed out to the assembled subjects. As 
the test forms were handed out, every third subject became a member 
of the same group. This procedure was employed both to randomly 
assign groups, and to minimize any variations from extraneous sources 
- . 
(such as class seating position, inter-class differences, etc.). 
Subjects were asked to fill out the questionnaire according 
to the instructions printed on each sheet. Subjects were cautioned 
to read the instructions carefully before beginning (at the suggestion 
of the high school students' teacher, this point was emphasized with 
these subjects). 
After collection of all test forms, the subjects were explain-
ed the methods and purposes of the experiment, and their reactions 
solicited. To acquire some qualitative information about the faking 
of tests, 12 college subjects were ~nterviewed in an unstructured 
manner; they were asked how they went about responding to the fak-
ing instruction, which items were most difficult, ,and asked for any 
detailed reactions. These subjects were all selected from the two 
faking groups. 
Following the data collection, all tests were scored by 
the author using the hand scoring key (Zung, 1974b). 
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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
The hypotheses generated from the literature concern only 
some of the comparisons of group means that are possible with the 
collected data. Specifically, we are interested in the comparison 
between the high school control group and the high school fake-good 
group (H1), the high school control and fake-bad groups (H2), the 
college control and fake-good groups (H3), the college control and 
fake-bad groups (H4), and the two control groups (H5). Therefore, 
the data were analyzed by the method of planned comparisons described 
by Winer (1971). Such a procedure allows the maximum power to detect 
significant differences between the group comparisons of ~ priori 
theoretical interest, while not examining those comparisons that 
would be conceptually meaningless. 
The analysis of planned comparisons is essentially a tech-
nique that contrasts pairs of group means (in combinations that test 
out specific, planned hypotheses) by means of a weighted sum of 
group totals. The contrast is then tested as an F ratio (Winer, 1971, 
p.174). The particular weights chosen to test'the five hypotheses 
are listed in Table 1. 
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TABLE 1 
WEIGHTS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF PLANNED CO~~ARISONS 
Group 
Hypothesis 
H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 
High School 
Fake-Good 1 0 0 0 0 
Control -1 1 0 0 1 
Fake-Bad 0 -1 0 0 0 
College 
Fake-Good 0 0 1 0 0 
Control 0 0 -1 1 -1 
Fake-Bad 0 0 0 -1 0 
Note. Derived from a procedure by Winer (1971) 
RESULTS 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The mean SDS scores and standard deviations for the six groups 
are listed in Table 2. The mean SDS indices for the high school sam-
ple were: fake-good group= 39.64, control group= 43.88, and fake-
bad group= 76.52. In the college sample, the mean SDS indices were: 
fake-good group = 35.72, control group = 44.92, and fake-bad group 
= 80.60. Both of these control group means are noticably higher than 
the reported 11 normal" mean SDS scores for adults. 
As can be noted from Table 2, the standard deviations for the 
control and fake-good groups are similar, but quite different from 
the standard deviations obtained from the fake'-bad groups. This data 
is consistent with that reported by Swanson and Anderson (1972): the 
standard deviations for the fake-bad conditions are approximately 
twice that for the other two conditions. It seems likely that this 
increased deviation in the fake-bad condition is due to the larger 
scoring range available in the more depressed direction on the SDS. 
This increased range could result in greater variance within the fake-
bad groups. 
ANALYSIS OF PLANNED CO~~ARISONS 
There were five hypotheses generated in this study; three were 
supported by the data. The results of the analysis of planned compari-
sons are outlined in Table 3. 
35 
r 
I 
TABLE 2 
MEAN SDS INDICES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
FOR HIGH SCHOOL AND COLLEGE GROUPS 
a Group Mean Standard 
Deviation 
High School 
Fake-Good 39.64 6.94 
Control 43.88 6.76 
Fake-Bad 76.52 14.40 
College 
Fake-Good 35.72 6.57 
Control 44.92 7.30 
Fake-Bad 80. (:IJ 15.11 
a !! = 25 for all groups 
TABLE 3 
ANALYSIS OF PLANNED COMPARISONS 
Comparisons ss df MS F 
H1 224.72 1 224.72 2.068 
H2 13,317.12 1 13,317.12 122.558 * \JJ 
-..J 
H3 1,058.00 1 1,058.00 9.737 * 
H4 15,913.28 1 15,913.28 146.450 * 
H5 13.52 1 13.52 0.124 
Error 15,647.52 144 108.66 
* p < .'o1 ' F(1, 144) 
-
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High School Sample (Hypotheses H1 and H2) 
In the high school sample, those subjects instructed to fake 
less depressed on the SDS did not obtain significantly lower scores 
than the high school control subjects (F = 2.068, ns). Hence this 
hypothesis was not supported. 
The subjects instructed to fake in the more depressed dir-
rection on the SDS did score significantly higher than the high 
school controls (F = 122.558, p < .01), supporting this hypothesis. 
The results from the high school sample are similar to those 
reported in previous research on the faking of SDS scores. High 
school subjects were able to fake the SDS significantly more de-
pressed (H2), but were unable to fake significantly in the less de-
pressed direction (H1). 
College Sample (Hypotheses H3 and H4) 
With the college students, subjects instructed to fake the 
SDS in the less depressed direction scored significantly lower than 
the college control subjects (F = 9.737, p <.01). This hypothesis 
was supported. 
Those subjects instructed to fake in the more depressed dir-
rection obtained significantly higher SDS scores than the control 
subjects (F = 146.450, p <.01), supporting this hypothesis. 
' Both hypotheses concerning the college sample were supported 
by the data. Both the fake-good (H3) and fake-bad (H4) groups scored 
significantly different than the college control group, in their 
respective directions. As expected, the fake-bad group scored 
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farther from the control group mean than did the fake-good group. 
Comparison of Normal Scores (H5) 
The difference between the high school and college control 
groups was nonsignificant (f = 0.124, ns), failing to support the 
hypothesis. The high school control group mean of 43.88 was slight-
ly lower than Mikesell and Calhoun's (1969) report of 48.35, but 
more interestingly, the college control group mean of 44.92 was 
considerably higher than Swanson and Anderson's (1972) college 
sample mean of 35.1 
In sum, the hypothesis that the high school control group 
would score higher SDS indices than the college control group was 
not supported. The high school subjects obtained scores somewhat 
similar to those previously reported, but the college subjects 
scored noticably higher than expected, rendering the comparison 
nonsignificant. 
DISCUSSION 
FAKING LESS DEPRESSED ON THE SDS 
The hypothesis that subjects can manipulate SDS scores in 
order to appear less depressed was partially supported by the present 
data. College subjects did score significantly lower than their 
college control group, but high school subjects did not. There seem 
to be several factors contributing to this finding. 
In examining the data in Table 2, it becomes apparent that 
the college results proved significant for two statistical reasons. 
The college fake-good scores were noti~eably lower than those in the 
high school fake-good group (Mcol = 35.72 versus Mhs = 39.64); and 
secondly, the college control group scored slightly higher than their 
high school counterparts (M 1 = 44.92 versus~ = 42.88). Although -oo ~s 
both of these factors would tend to increase the significance of 
college fake-good versus control group differences, clearly the most 
significant contributor was the lower college fake-good scores. This 
indicates that the college subjects manipulated their SDS scores 
farther toward the less depressed end of the scale; they did a more 
convincing job of faking less depressed. 
There are several possible reasons for this, the most salient 
being that the college subjects were older than their high school 
counterparts (22.16 versus 15.60 years). It may be that increased 
age and experience were related to more effective test faking. More 
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college subjects seemed to know the depressive implications of the 
subtler SDS items, allowing them to fake better than the younger and 
less experienced high school subjects. 
As an alternate hypothesis to explain these fake-good results, 
one might note the sex differences in group composition. With the 
high school group being all male and the college group 80% female, 
one might suggest that the results reflect greater faking abilities 
in female subjects. This suggestion, however, runs counter to the 
previously reported finding that there were no sex differences in 
either control group or faking group SDS scores (Mikesell & Calhoun, 
1969). As a result, this interpretation seems unsupported at present. 
An analysis of the scores from the high school fake-good 
group tentatively supports the suggestion that age differences be-
tween the groups were primarily responsible for the college group's 
greater ability to manipulate SDS scores. The high school groups 
were composed of roughly 2/3 freshmen (aged 14-15) and 1/3 seniors 
(aged 18-19). When the high school scores are divided by age (fresh-
men versus seniors), one not~s that the freshmen (!! = 19) obtained 
an SDS mean of 40.79; while the seniors in the same group (!! = 6) 
averaged an SDS score of 36.00. This high school senior mean of 
36.00 is almost identical to the college fake-good mean of 35.72, 
and noticably lower than the freshmen score. The difference between 
the senior and freshmen means was tested post hoc by·means of a 
!-test, but failed to reach significance (! = 1.48, B = .08). This 
is not surprising in view of the small number of scores in such an 
intragroup comparison. Even though the difference between the 
freshmen and senior high school subjects was not statistically sig-
nificant, the trend of the data does offer speculative support for 
the notion that older subjects can more effectively bias SDS scores 
in the less depressed direction. 
Interview data from the college subjects revealed several 
interesting aspects of the faking process that may explain the failure 
of previous efforts at faking in the less depressed direction. Many 
of the items were obvious and offered no challenge to determine non-
depressed responses. Some, however, were perceived as being more 
difficult to manipulate. The items pointed out as being most diffi-
cult were the subtler ones, especially item 2 (11 Morning is when I 
feel the best11 ), item 4 (11 I have trouble sleeping through the night"), 
item 5 (11 I eat as much as I used to11 ) and item 7 (11 I notice that I 
am losing weight"). In these cases, subjects were often unsure of 
how to respond in order to appear less depressed. A common response 
strategy was that many of the subjects used themselves as 11 anchor 
points11 when attempting to answer the subtler items, seeing them-
selves as examples of nondepressed persons. They based their re-
sponses to these items on their own preferences. 
This strategy, however, is not always accurate. One can 
often end up responding in the opposite direction than planned. 
Item 7, concerning weight loss, must be answered 11 none or a little 
of the time" to appear less depressed than normal. .Yet, one female 
subject, using herself as an anchor point, responded 11 most or all 
of the time 11 when attempting to fake-good. Being somewhat overweight, 
she perceived weight loss positively, and hence a counterindication 
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of depression in her own experience. Weight loss is positively 
related to depression on the SDS. 
Other personalizations of the test items did aid subjects in 
faking efforts. One fake-good subject knew the appropriate direction 
to answer item 2 ("Morning is when I feel the best") because she 
reported experiencing difficulties in the mornings during depressive 
episodes in her own life. 
When responding to uncertain items, subjects often ans'tvered 
in the moderate response catagories, instead of answering 11 none11 or 
"all of the time", presumably to minimize any error they might :make 
in choosing inappropriate answers. These moderate responses act to 
reduce the significance of any differences between faking groups and 
control groups. However, many of the items were marked in the center 
categories in both faking groups, even on relatively obvious items. 
It is uncertain why subjects responded in this way, as extreme re-
sponses are needed to appear significantly less or more depressed 
than normal. 
A response strategy noted by several of the subjects has 
bearing on the previous failures to demonstrate faking in the less 
depressed direction (Mikesell & Calhoun, 1969; Swanson & Anderson, 
1972). Subjects explained that when they read the fake-good in-
structions, many assumed themselves to be basically happy and well-
adjusted, and therefore described themselves when responding in the 
fake-good condition. They interpreted the experimental instructions 
in such a way that these fake-good subjects and the control subjects 
were responding to essentially the same directions: ndescribe your-
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self". It is clear that such a strategy would attenuate any suspected 
differences between the control and fake-good groups. 'Vlith instruc-
tions such as Mikesell and Calhoun's (1969), where subjects are asked 
to describe "best impressions" of themselves, any such personalizing 
tendencies might be exaggerated and could lead to reduced differences 
between fake-good and control group totals--exactly the results re-
ported in both previous attempts to investigate faking on the SDS. 
It is presumed that the depersonalization of the instructions in the 
present study minimized this strategy to the level where one could 
observe significant differences between the college control and fake-
good groups. 
Summary 
The hypothesis that subjects can fake in the less depressed 
direction on the SDS was partially supported. There seems to be a 
clear distinction between the faking performance of younger and 
older subjects, with the older college subjects being able to bias 
SDS scores in order to appear significantly less depressed than 
controls. Several factors revealed in post-test interviews suggest 
that some of the reasons for previous nonsignificant findings may 
have been due to the response strategies of many subjects, which 
were encouraged by the particular instructions used in previous 
research. These response strategies act to attenuate any difference 
between control and fake-good group totals. The instructions employed 
in the present study are presumed to have discouraged such strategies 
to the point where they did not negate significant differences be-
tween the college fake-good and control groups. 
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This positive finding suggests that clinicians should be 
careful about relying on SDS information when testing individuals 
who might have something to gain by appearing less depressed than 
they actually are. The present results support the contention that 
patients may be able to fake less depressed on the SDS. 
FAKING MORE DEPRESSED ON THE SDS 
The results indicate that experimental subjects did manipulate 
SDS scores in order to appear ~ depressed than control subjects. 
This was supported with both college and high school samples, and is 
consistent with previous investigations. 
The fake-bad group means of 76.52 and 80.60 were significantly 
higher than control means, and fall into the range described as 11 se-
verly depressed" by Zung (1973). Interpreting this evidence with 
that previously reported, it is quite clear that faking toward more 
depressed scores on the SDS is easily accomplished. Those using the 
depression scale in clinical settings should be careful about analyz-
ing unusually high SDS scores, or about relying on SDS information 
when diagnosing or treating individuals suspected of malingering, or 
having other reason to appear more depressed than might be the case. 
Interestingly, as in the fake-good groups, there seems to be 
the suggestion of an age effect in faking-bad on the SDS, with older 
subjects again more successful at test manipulation. In the high 
school fake-bad group, the 19 freshmen obtained a mean score of 
75.32; while the six seniors in the group obtained a mean of 80.33--
almost identical to the overall college fake-bad mean of 80.60. The 
difference between the freshmen and senior high school subjects was 
tested post-hoc by means of a !-test, but found to be nonsignificant 
(t = 0.71, p = ns). Although an age effect was found to be nonsig-
nificant within the high school group, such a tendency is consistent 
.~· . .;.,· 
with the author's impressions of the seriousness and maturity with 
which the younger and older subjects attended to the task. The high 
school seniors and college subjects seemed subjectively more mature 
and involved in the experiment. This impression should, of course, 
be considered tentatively. 
Summary 
The present study is consistent with other research in re-
porting that subjects can appear wBXkedly more depressed on the SDS 
than is actually the case. Combining these findings with those that 
indicate positive results when attempting to fake-good, it becomes 
apparent that contrary to previous reports, the SDS is open to mani-
pulation in both directions. Clinical and research users of the SDS 
should be cautious in relying on SDS data alone to determine the 
strength of depressive symptoms. As with other assessment techniques~ 
valid information from the SDS requires a cooperative relationship 
between subject and examiner. Only when the test subject perceives 
the assessment as a cooperative effort can we be sure that the in-
ventory's data is an accurate assessment of the patient's experience 
of his depressive symptoms. 
"NORMAL" SDS SCORES 
The results did not support the hypothesis that high school 
t 
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control subjects would score higher on the SDS than their college 
counterparts: the difference between the two control groups was 
nonsignificant. 
To understand this finding, a review of the previous research 
is in order. Mikesell and Calhoun (1969) suggested that the mean 
normal SDS index for high school students was much higher than Zung's 
(1965) data would indicate. Zung reported the adult normal SDS score 
was 35; Mikesell and Calhoun found high school control group means 
averaging 48.35, a sizable difference. They used high school juniors 
as subjects, who are commonly from 16 to 17 years old, although they 
did not report age data for their sample. 
Swanson and Anderson (1972) tested college-aged subjects 
(mean age= 22.1 years) and obtained a control group mean of 35.1 on 
the SDS--quite similar to Zung's adult figure of 33. This result 
suggested that college control subjects would accurately mirror the 
adult normal scores for the purposes of this experiment. Because 
both high school and college populations were to be tested in the 
present study, it was expected that a comparison between the high 
school and college control groups would measure the hypothesized 
difference between high school and adult normal SDS scores. The 
present college control group mean age was 21.92, comparing quite 
closely with Swanson and Anderson's sample. 
Ho~ver, the comparison did not prove to be an effective 
test of the hypothesis, because the college controls scored much 
higher SDS indices than expected. Their mean of 44.92 was elevated 
far beyond Zung's (1965) or Swanson and Anderson's data would predict. 
The high school control group mean of 43.88 was also higher than the 
published normal scores, but not quite as high as Mikesell and Cal-
houn's (1969) suggestion. The comparison between them was nonsig-
nificant because both groups were elevated to the same level. Why 
did the control groups score so high? 
The elevations of these normal score estimates is consistent 
with a trend in the SDS literature toward raising the estimated SDS 
"normal" score. Zung (1965) originally reported normals averaged 
33 on the SDS. He later revised his estimate to 37 in a cross-cul-
tural study (1969), and finally reported that a combination of much 
eXisting data suggested a more accurate report of the normal mean 
would be 39 (Zung, 1972). He also cautioned that SDS baseline scores 
in younger and older subjects (younger than 20 and older than 65) were 
likely to be higher still. An SDS mean of 48 was found in testing a 
group of normal elderly subjects, aged 65 to 95 (Z1L~g, 1967b). 
The present normal means of 43.88 and 44.92 seem to support 
this notion of increased SDS baselines in young subjects. The higher 
baseline levels would suggest that younger and older subjects as a 
group experience more of the symptoms related to depression than do 
middle-aged adults. Zung (1967b) reports this to be the case with 
his older subjects. The present data suggests it may also apply to 
adolescents and college-aged individuals. Adolescence is a particu-
larly stressful period of development, and this stress could manifest 
itself by increased depressive symptomatology reported by younger 
persons. An alternate hypothesis to explain the increased baseline 
SDS levels in younger and older populations is that the SDS might 
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be biased toward those depressive symptoms that are most often ex-
perienced by these populations. More data is needed, however, to 
explore this interpretation. 
This evidence warrants the use of caution when interpreting 
SDS scores for high school or college-aged individuals. Although 
most of these subjects will fall into the "normal" range of SDS 
scores, there is an increased probability of misdiagnosis of depres-
sion when using norms developed on adult populations with younger 
test subjects. A more detailed examination of the norms for all age 
groups is clearly needed. 
Summary 
The hypothesis that high school subjects would score higher 
SDS indices than normal college-aged subjects was not supported; 
but apparently because both the high school and college groups scorea 
higher than expected, thus rendering the comparison nonsignificant. 
This evidence is consistent with a trend in the SDS literature that 
has gradually increased the estimated normal SDS mean to 39, and has 
indicated that younger and older subjects tend to obtain higher aver-
age SDS scores. It may be that these younger and older populations 
are, in fact, more depressed than normal, or it may simply reflect a 
bias in the test items toward those depressive symptoms experienced 
more often by these populations. Caution is suggested when inter-
preting high SDS scores for high school and college individuals; and 
a more extensive investigation of SDS norms for all age groups is 
called for. 
SUMMARY 
This investigation examined the potential of test faking 
on the Self-rating Depression Scale. Specifically, the question 
was asked: can the SDS be manipulated to appear both ~ and 
less depressed? Previous research had demonstrated successful 
faking toward more depressed scores, but had been unable to show 
faking toward less depressed scores. This finding runs counter to 
the literature on the faking of other personality and diagnostic 
tests; many other instruments have been successfully faked in the 
positive or less abnormal direction. 
It was hypothesized that previous failures to demonstrate 
faking toward less depressed scores on the SDS were the result of 
1) statistical constraints that required fake-good subjects to 
score in the extreme categories in order to appear significantly 
less depressed than controls, and 2) the possibly inhibitory effect 
of personalized instructions that might attenuate differences be-
tween the control and fake-good groups. 
The present study employed different experimental instruc-
tions that were depersonalized to facilitate responding in the 
extreme scoring categories. It also tested both populations pre-
viously used to explore faking on the SDS: high school and college 
students. 
Results indicated that college aged fake-good subjects 
scored significantly lower SDS indices than controls; however, the 
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younger high school fake-good subjects did not obtain significantly 
lower scores than their control group. An age effect was hypothe-
sized as mediating this performance. Older subjects (aged 18 and 
over) could more effectively manipulate the SDS to appear less de-
pressed than controls. Both the high school and college fake-bad 
groups scored significantly higher than controls, reaffirming the 
demonstration of the fakability of the SDS toward more depressed 
scores. Again, the older college subjects were slightly more ef-
fective at this. 
Clinicians are advised to interpret cautiously SDS scores 
when dealing with patients who might have something to gain by 
distorting information revealed on a depression scale. Evidence 
indicates that individuals can manipulate the SDS to appear more or 
less depressed than they actually are. A cooperative subject-ex-
aminer relationship is suggested as the most effective way to control 
such distortions. 
An interesting finding concerning the control groups was 
also noted. It was suggested from previous research that high 
school control subjects would score higher than the published SDS 
normal levels. This hypothesis was tested by comparing the high 
school and college control groups. It was found, however, that 
both control groups scored considerably higher than expected, achiev-
ing similarly elevated mean SDS scores. The comparison was there-
fore nonsignificant, but the elevation of both control group means 
was consistent with evidence suggesting an increase in the estimation 
of the 11 normal mean11 SDS score, and with evidence pointing to 
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increased SDS baselines in younger (than 20) and older (than 65) 
individuals. Caution is urged when interpreting moderately ele-
vated SDS scores with these populations. 
' j 
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ZUNG'S CRITERIA FOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDERS 
I. Pervasive affective disturbances 
1. Depressed, sad and blue 
2. Tearful 
II. Physiological disturbances 
1. Diurnal variation: exaggeration of symptoms in the early 
morning and some relief as the day goes on 
2. Sleep: characteristically early or frequent waking 
3. Appetite: decreased food intake 
4. Weight loss: associated with decreased food intake, or 
increased metabolism and decreased rest 
5. Sex: decreased libido 
6. Gastrointestinal: constipation 
7. Cardiovascular : tachycardia 
8. Musculoskeletal: fatigue 
III. Psychomotor disturbances 
1. Agitation 
2. Retardation 
IV. Psychological disturbances 
1. Confusion 
2. F_l!lptiness 
3. Hopelessness 
4. Indecisiveness 
5. Irritability 
6. Dissatisfaction 
7. Personal devaluation 
8. Suicidal rumination 
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Answar these items honestly as they apply to you. 
None OR 
Age Sc• Dote o little Some of Good Port Most OR All 
---
of the Time the Tome of the Time of the Time 
.I. I fP.el down-hearted, blue and sod 
2. Morning is when I feel the best 
3. I hove crying spells or feel like it 
4. I hove tro~ble sleeping through the night 
5. I eat os much os I used to 
6. I en,oy looking ot, talking to and being 
with attractive women I men 
7. I notice that I _om losing weight 
8. I hove trouble with constipation 
9. My heart beats foster than usual 
10. I get tired for no reason 
11. My mind is os clear os it used to be 
12. I lind it easy to do the things I used to 
13. I om restless and con t keep stiil 
14. I feel hopeful about the future 
15. I am more irritable than usual 
--
1---
-I 6. I lind it easy to make decisions 
I 7. I feel that I am useful and needed 
18. My life is pretty full 
19. I feel !hot others would be better off if I were dead 
20. I still enjoy the things I used to do J 
CG 
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Answer these itecs so as to create the best possible 
impression. Try to answer as if you were describing someone 
who was completely happy and without any emotional problems. 
Respond in this way even if the answers seem obvious to you, 
or if they would be untrue if applied to you, 
None OR 
Age Sex Dote o Lillie Some of Good Pori Most OR All 
---
of the Time the Time of !nc Time of the Time 
·1: I feel down-hearted, blue and sod 
2. Morning is when I feel lhe best 
3. I hove crying spells or feel like it 
4. I hove trouble sleeping through the nrght 
5. I eot os much os I used lo 
6. I enjoy looking ot, talking to end being 
with oltroclive women/men 
7. I notice thai I om losing weight 
8. I hove !rouble with conslrpolion 
9. My hcorl bears foster than usual 
10. I get lired for no reason 
1 I. My mind _is os clear as it used fo be 
12. I find it ~?~Y to do the things I used to 
-
13. I om restless and con t keep still 
14. I feel hopeful oboul the future 
15. I om more irritable lhon usual 
--- ------
16. I find it cosy ro make decisions 
- r---
17. I fccllhot I om useful and needed 
18. My life is prefly full ----· 
r------ ----
------
19. I feel lhot others would be better off if I were deed 
20. I still enjoy the things I used lo do l 
. 
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Answer these items so as to create the worst possible 
impression. Try to answer as if you were describing someone 
who was completely unhappy and with many emotional problems, 
Respond in this way even if the answers seem obvious to you, 
or if they would be untrue if applied to you. 
None OR 
Age Sex Dote o Little Some of Good Port Most OR All 
--- of the Time the Time of rne Time of the Time 
1. I f~el down-hearted, blue and sod 
2. Morning is when I feel the best 
3. I hove crying spells or feel like it ' 
4. I hove trouble sleeping through the night 
5. I eat as much as I used to 
6. I enjoy looking at, talking to and being 
with attractive women/men 
7. I notice that I om losing weight 
8. I hove trouble with constipation 
9. My heart beats foster than usual 
10. I get tired for no reason 
11. My mind is as clear as it used to be 
12. I find it cosy to do the things I used to 
13. I om rest less and con I keep still 
14. I feel hopeful about the future 
15. I om more irritable than usual 
16. I find it cosy to make decisions 
-1--· --
17. I feel that I om useful and needed 
·---
18. My life is pretty full 
19. I feel that others would be better off if I were dead 
20. I still enjoy the things I used to do 
-
FB 
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